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 REVIEW ARTICLE
 RELIGION AND CHINESE CULTURE: TOWARD
 AN ASSESSMENT OF "POPULAR RELIGION"
 Shifts in terminology may be harbingers of a revolutionary new paradigm
 or a repackaging of older dilemmas. Recently some terminological rear-
 rangements have emerged with sufficient consistency in studies of Chinese
 religion and culture to warrant examination of their implicit assumptions and
 practical ramifications. In brief, the trend in the study of Chinese religion,
 and in the history of religions generally, has been to talk of "popular reli-
 gion," "local religion," or, most recently, "popular religious cultures" instead
 of "folk" and "elite" religions or "great" and "little" traditions.' Certainly, the
 problems besetting the older terms have been amply debated and demon-
 strated. However, are the new terms more effective replacements? That is, do
 they actually transcend the persistent assumptions of their predecessors,
 enabling us to perceive and analyze dynamics barely visible on earlier hori-
 zons? From the standpoints of five recent books on Chinese religion and
 culture, the horizon certainly begins to look less familiar and more promis-
 ing. Although these books may not constitute a revolution, both their modest
 revisions as well as their daring near misses suggest that the study of Chinese
 religion is undergoing a fascinating shift. There is a new maturity in the
 variety of disciplines contributing perspectives and data to an open dialogue
 I For an excellent review of such terms in recent studies of European history, see
 Mary R. O'Neil, "From 'Popular' to 'Local' Religion: Issues in Early Modern Euro-
 pean Religious History," Religious Studies Review 12, no. 3/4 (July/October 1986):
 222-26.
 01989 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
 0018-2710/89/2901-0003$01.00
 Review Articles
 on basic issues. There is also a new deftness and simplicity in the focus on
 religious phenomena, a focus that does not isolate religion for the sake of a
 false clarity but rather explores religion as fully embedded in society and
 culture. Finally, one theme is central to all of these books-to uncover
 "popular religion" and to analyze the relationship between religion and
 culture implied by such a phenomenon. By exploring the treatments of this
 theme, I hope to discern the direction of these works as a whole and to begin
 to assess the innovations they introduce.
 I
 Historians of religions employ a variety of orientations toward the termino-
 logical debates involving religion and culture depending upon whether they
 are most familiar with historical studies of textual traditions, ethnographic
 studies of primarily oral cultures, or European religions as opposed to Asian
 religions. For example, a focus on textual traditions promoted an early
 distinction between "universal" and "folk" religions which was used to dif-
 ferentiate the religion of the nation-state from the religion of the tribe, either
 in terms of distinct societies or distinct strata within a single society.2 Another
 framework based on textual criteria used the categories of "primitive,"
 "classical," and "modern" to classify types of religions and religious experi-
 ences.3 The concern for textual traditions vis-a-vis oral culture is also repre-
 sented in a distinction between "universal" and "local" religious traditions.4
 Some terms are associated with particular cultural areas. For example,
 studies of European Christianity have generally worked with a distinction
 between "popular" religion on the one hand and "official" or "institutional"
 religion on the other, while studies of Asian religions have been shaped by
 Robert Redfield's differentiation of "great" and "little" traditions.5 Other
 distinct orientations include Max Weber's typology of "traditional" versus
 "rational" religions, which was also adapted to various attempts to charac-
 2 Pieter Hendrik Vrijhof and Jacques Waardenburg, eds., Official and Popular
 Religion: Analysis of a Theme for Religious Studies, Religion and Society 19 (The
 Hague: Mouton, 1979), p. 1.
 3 Joseph M. Kitagawa, "Primitive, Classical, and Modern Religions: A Perspective
 on Understanding the History of Religions," in The History of Religions: Essays on the
 Problem of Understanding, ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa et al. (Chicago: University of
 Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 39-66.
 4 See Bernard Faure's discussion of the universal, or "unlocalizing," tendencies of
 Buddhism in comparison to regionally limited popular traditions in "Space and Place
 in the Chinese Religious Tradition," History of Religions 26, no. 4 (May 1987): 337-56.
 Faure adapts the terms "utopian" and "locative" as used by Jonathan Z. Smith (Map Is
 Not Territory [Leiden: Brill, 1978]), which raises some interesting connections between
 the worldviews described by Smith and the forms of social organization indicated by
 Faure.
 5 Vrijhof and Waardenburg in particular have explored wider applications of the
 distinction between popular and official religion. Robert Redfield, Peasant Society and
 Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).
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 terize a historical transition from folk to universal religion.6 New attention to
 the differences between "oral" and "literate" communities as a basic typology,
 however, is reminding us of the difficulties of using textually oriented models
 to analyze the religions of pre- or nonliterate peoples.7
 The variety of categories and terms as well as their shifts in popularity
 testify to a complicated and ongoing intellectual debate. Perhaps no single
 scholar demonstrates recent developments in this area more clearly than the
 historian Natalie Z. Davis, whose work regularly cuts through the chaos of
 current practice to articulate directions and issues. Indeed, two articles pub-
 lished nearly ten years apart provide an excellent index to changing ter-
 minology in the historical study of religion. In the first, a 1974 study entitled
 "Some Tasks and Themes in the Study of Popular Religion," Davis chal-
 lenged a model of European Christianity that distinguished folk religion from
 official religion and magic from religion.8 Focusing on Keith Thomas's
 Religion and the Decline of Magic, whose sophisticated treatment of the
 complexities of medieval notions of religion and magic emphasized the his-
 torical origins and rationale behind this distinction, Davis called attention to
 the particular bias inhering in these terms.9 She suggested another approach,
 an exploration of "popular religion" that would go beyond historically de-
 rived and socially nuanced formulas. Specifically, Davis raised three issues
 that effectively defined the limits of the older dichotomies and set a new
 agenda for analysis of "popular religion" in general. First, she maintained, lay
 piety (i.e., folk religion, magic, or a "ritual method of living") could not be
 understood adequately when set off from so-called rational beliefs; second,
 6 Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, trans. E. Fischoff (Boston: Beacon, 1964).
 Such approaches include Joachim Wach's study of primitive and "founded" religions
 (Sociology of Religion [1944; reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971]);
 and Robert Bellah's categories (primitive, archaic, historical, and modern) in Beyond
 Belief (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 20-50.
 7 See Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge
 University Press, 1977), and The Interface between the Written and the Oral (Cam-
 bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); also Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy
 (London: Methuen, 1982). The application of traditional history of religions to oral
 traditions is represented by several articles in Lauri Honko, ed., Science of Religion:
 Studies in Methodology (The Hague: Mouton, 1979) which address oral traditions
 either as a background to canon formation or through the tools of source criticism.
 Various correctives are proposed by Sam Gill in "Nonliterate Traditions and Holy
 Books: Toward a New Model," in The Holy Book in Comparative Perspective,
 ed. Frederick M. Denny and Rodney L. Taylor (Columbia: University of South
 Carolina Press, 1985), pp. 224-40. In an interesting contrast to Gill's approach,
 William A. Graham explores the oral aspects of scriptures within literate traditions in
 Beyond the Written Word (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
 8 Natalie Zemon Davis, "Some Tasks and Themes in the Study of Popular Religion,"
 in The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, ed. Charles
 Trinkaus and Heiko A. Oberman (Leiden: Brill, 1974), pp. 307-36.
 9 Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (New York: Scribners, 1971). It
 is interesting to note that the historical origins of the distinction between magic and
 religion were certainly not unknown before Thomas, yet prior to this period that did
 not constitute an argument for analytical bias-probably the opposite.
 37
 Review Articles
 such bifurcations inevitably failed to reveal the commonality among groups
 of laity and clergy in their recourse to various local practices and institutions;
 and third, the polarization of institutional and local levels of practice ob-
 scured the dynamics of change within the tradition as a whole.10 Influenced
 by the cultural anthropology of Clifford Geertz, Davis went on to propose
 that such distinctions as religion and magic be examined for how they were
 used in specific historical periods to create a "whole" that structured experi-
 ence and reinforced the social order." The major ramification of this new
 approach for historians concerned with social change, she suggested, would
 be to make them look beyond the effects of doctrinal innovations and
 individual leaders to examine how the institutional contexts for popular
 religion shifted with economic, demographic, or political forces. Certainly, in
 the sense mapped out in this 1974 article, the term "popular religion" was
 extensively used in European historical studies by 1976.
 In an article published in 1982, Davis again addressed the ramifications of
 the term "popular religion," lamenting that broad and ambiguous usage had
 obscured any analytic power it might have had.'2 At best, for Davis, it
 indicated what people actually did rather than simply what they were sup-
 posed to do, and thus served to extend the definition of religion "beyond
 formal doctrine to widespread belief and beyond prescribed piety to actual
 practise."'3 Still, this did not address the major problem besetting the term
 "popular religion." While it had been used to describe religious practices that
 could not be assumed to belong to just one social class or segment of society,
 it clearly could not simply mean "widespread" practices, as various studies of
 popular religion had made clear. Davis cited the example of a seventeenth-
 century Bolognese seamstress, whose spirituality was certainly not common
 to everyone in her society nor even typical of any subgroup other than single
 young women at that time and place.14 Thus, on one level, it was unclear
 whether "popular religion" pointed to particular classes or to particularly
 pervasive social practices. On another level, it was unclear whether it in-
 dicated an attitude developed within medieval culture or an analytic tool
 developed by modern historians. Although Davis did not make the point, it
 appears that the growing ambiguity of "popular religion" was due in part to
 an increasing distance from the historical conditions in which the term first
 emerged as a corrective of earlier dichotomies (i.e., the debate with magic vs.
 religion). As a revisionist term, it was most useful for suggesting the existence
 of social attitudes and practices that cut across the categories of previous
 analyses. Yet when removed from this historiographical context, "popular
 10 Davis, "Some Tasks and Themes," pp. 307-12. Similar points attend almost every
 critique of two-tiered theories.
 11 Ibid., p. 312.
 12 Natalie Zemon Davis, "From 'Popular Religion' to Religious Cultures," in Refor-
 mation Europe: A Guide to Research, ed. Steven Ozment (St. Louis: Center for
 Reformation Research, 1982), pp. 321-43; also see O'Neil (n. 1 above), pp. 222-23.
 13 Davis, "From 'Popular Religion' to Religious Cultures," p. 321.
 14 Ibid., p. 323.
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 religion" either became a trendy substitute for "folk religion," or it was
 reified as a third level of social interaction that mediated the poles of the
 earlier dichotomies.
 Given the difficulties of the term, Davis suggested yet another approach, a
 new "contextual and comparative" approach that would focus on "religious
 cultures." The term "religious cultures" appears to indicate a level of analysis
 that Davis came to consider more fundamental than the analysis of institu-
 tional dynamics promoted in her 1974 study.15 Indeed, "religious cultures"
 defined religious practice as those symbolic activities by which people made
 and remade the sociocultural world in which they lived.16 Hence, this ap-
 proach saw religion as generating both cultural categories and social organi-
 zation. Davis concluded her 1982 article by focusing on ritual as the activities
 that would most effectively disclose to researchers the dynamics of a "reli-
 gious culture." 7
 These two articles portray three distinct positions or stages of analysis. In
 the first-stage position, expediently if not altogether appropriately repre-
 sented here by Keith Thomas, European society was seen as socially bifur-
 cated into the two levels of official elite and das Volk, the peasantry. A
 second-stage position, articulated in Davis's 1974 article, challenged the
 bifurcation of these terms, attempting to recognize various unities between
 them. Thus, in reaction to the divisiveness of "official" and "folk" religion,
 the term "popular religion" was appropriated to designate an emphasis on
 social unities. In the third stage of this procession of terms (e.g., "elite/
 folk," to "popular" religion, to "religious cultures") historians appear to have
 sought a notion of culture that would recognize how a society produces both
 differences and unities within its cultural categories and social organization.
 These historians have tended to focus on symbolic activities (such as ritual,
 pilgrimage, and carnival) rather than the institutional frameworks of popular
 practice that were the focus of the second perspective.'8
 II
 As described here, these three positions greatly simplify more complex argu-
 ments, but they are helpful in sorting out the variety of approaches to
 Chinese religion. Certainly, Chinese religion has long been analyzed in terms
 15 Ibid., pp. 322-23.
 16 Ibid., pp. 321-23, 331.
 17 Ibid., pp. 326-36. Davis suggests that "religious cultures" is rather similar in
 meaning to what William Christian, Jr., calls "local religion" or Carlo Ginzberg terms
 the "religion of the popular classes," both of whom have also rejected the term
 "popular religion." All these terms attempt to reintegrate the perception of basic social
 differences with the existence of underlying cultural unities, that is, to affirm and
 analyze both unity and diversity, and to assert sociocultural interaction and diffusion
 in all directions. See Davis, "From 'Popular Religion' to Religious Cultures," p. 322;
 and O'Neil, p. 222, in particular.
 18 The reasons for a focus on ritual in studies which are concerned to promote a
 specifically "cultural" analysis are explored elsewhere. See Catherine Bell, "Discourse
 and Dichotomies: The Structure of Ritual Theory," Religion 17, no. 2 (1987): 95-118.
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 of elite and folk levels, while "popular religion" is now being used in a variety
 of ways. Sometimes various combinations and permutations of these terms
 have been employed with little rationale for their selection; at other times the
 choice of terms has expressed basic assumptions about Chinese religion.'9
 Ultimately, these terms represent a fundamental debate about Chinese society
 and culture.
 In an early challenge to the dichotomies of "elite/folk," "great/little," or
 "rational religion/superstitious supernaturalism" which constituted much of
 the framework of the first generation of scholarship on Chinese religion,
 C. K. Yang proposed an analysis of Chinese religion as having two aspects,
 "diffused" and "institutional."20 Maurice Freedman's seminal reading of
 Yang's study focused attention on a major ramification of this new
 approach-that "elite culture and peasant culture were not two different
 things; they were versions of each other."21 Freedman's own thesis held, in
 the face of the field's preponderant tendency to portray a fundamentally
 divided social system, that Chinese religion possessed both unity and dif-
 ference, having "entered into the unity of a vast polity" at the same time that
 it was "an intrinsic part of a hierarchized society."22 In contrast to the "tired
 intellectual world of the Great and Little Traditions," Freedman argued for a
 latent tradition of sociological analysis of underlying unities within Chinese
 culture. For example, he explained, the early Sinologist J. J. M. de Groot
 proposed an ethnographically based explanation "from the top down" to
 show how an elite form of religion degenerated into the observable crude
 features of peasant religion. Marcel Granet, on the other hand, from the
 armchair of textual materials and Durkheimian theory, argued "from the
 bottom up" to describe the development of elite religion from its peasant
 origins. According to Freedman, both de Groot and Granet recognized a
 basic unity of ideas within the diverse social hierarchy of Chinese society,
 even though they variously identified an elite or peasant source for these
 ideas. Yang's achievement, Freedman contended, was to ground this unity
 not in a historical source or a single social stratum, but in a common system
 19 For example, Evelyn S. Rawski's "Popular Religion in East Asia," Peasant Studies
 Newsletter 4, no. 4 (1975): 2-6, tended to use these terms interchangeably, although a
 slight nuance accompanying "popular religion" seems to emphasize symbolic dimen-
 sions over social ones. Barbara Ward, on the other hand, used terms that called atten-
 tion to major social differences in "Varieties of the Conscious Model: The Fishermen of
 South China," in The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology, ed. Michael
 Banton (New York, 1965), pp. 113-37.
 20 C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society (Berkeley: University of California Press,
 1976).
 21 Maurice Freedman, "On the Sociological Study of Chinese Religion," in The
 Study of Chinese Society: Essays by Maurice Freedman, selected and introduced by
 G. William Skinner (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1979), p. 355. (This
 essay first appeared in Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society, ed. Arthur P. Wolf
 [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1974], pp. 19-41.)
 22 Ibid., p. 353.
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 of religious ideas nourished by a regular exchange of ideas and practices
 between the elite and peasant populations.23
 Freedman's essay made explicit the relationship between terminological
 choices ("elite/folk" or "institutional/diffused," etc.) and the issue of a fun-
 damental unity or diversity in Chinese culture. Indeed, his essay and the
 reactions to it suggest a larger argument concerning issues very similar to
 those which Davis engaged. That is, an initial bifurcation of society into
 distinct social levels (a first-stage position) is challenged by a focus on
 underlying unities variously transformed by different subgroups (a second-
 stage position). Reactions to Freedman's position not only reiterated per-
 ceptions of a "vast gulf between the religion of the elite and that of the
 peasantry" but they also provided several new formulations of the case for
 diversity. For example, it was argued that any unities among Chinese reli-
 gious practices would be so abstract as to be meaningless, and it would be
 equally meaningless "to incorporate the local versions of Chinese peasant
 religion within a single tradition."24 Others suggested that the question of
 fundamental unity or fundamental diversity was simply the result of method:
 textually based studies dealt with the dissemination of such universal values
 as those of Buddhism among local religions, while ethnographic field studies
 constantly confronted the heterogeneity of local traditions.25 Yet it is interest-
 ing to note that in actual fact the "unity faction" is not represented only by
 text-based historians, nor is the "diversity faction" represented only by an-
 thropologists. For example, the anthropologist Stanley Tambiah is an out-
 spoken critic of the "two-level theory" of society. He suggests that such
 theories are "an invention of the anthropologist dictated not so much by the
 reality he studies as by his professional perspective."26 Yet the historian Peter
 Brown is equally condemnatory of "two-tier" theories.27 On the other hand,
 historians may be prone by the nature of their work to inherit or absorb
 dichotomies basic to the literate elite who left their texts for posterity, while
 anthropologists may be prone to absorbing the integrated worldview of a
 specific group. Thus, the terminological choices are not primarily dependent
 on one's major discipline. Instead, they more directly reflect the various
 perspectives on culture and religion seen in every discipline.
 Both sides of the "unity/diversity" issue describe a particular role for
 religion. Yang and Freedman promoted religion as the source of the cultural
 unity which underlay a socially diverse civilization. According to Yang, "the
 essential function of religion was to provide a collective symbol that would
 23 Ibid., pp. 355-66.
 24 James L. Watson, "Review Article: Anthropological Analyses of Chinese Reli-
 gion," China Quarterly 66 (June 1976): 358-59.
 25 This argument is discussed by Watson (ibid., p. 357), who cites articles by Arthur
 Wolf and Robert Smith in Wolf, ed., Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society.
 26 S. J. Tambiah, Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in North-east Thailand (Cambridge:
 Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 371.
 27 Peter Brown, The Cult of Saints (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 13-22.
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 transcend the divergence of economic interests, class status, and social back-
 ground, so as to make it possible to coalesce a large multitude into a
 community."28 Freedman also assumed "that a country of China's extent and
 political cohesion would demonstrate a large measure of agreement on reli-
 gious assumptions among all its people."29 In contrast, arguments for the
 diversity of religious practices have tended to see religion as variously re-
 flecting the social distinctions of its adherents, thereby emphasizing ethnic
 boundaries or differentiating social groups.30 In this debate, confrontation
 between an "elite/folk" bifurcation on the one hand and a single unified
 religious tradition on the other was a conflict between those focused on the
 empirical data of local-level religious practices and those focused on more
 abstract unities expressed as symbols, underlying structures, or values. As
 noted above, historians and anthropologists could be found in both groups.
 In a typical second-stage position, that is, one emphasizing cultural unity, the
 term "popular religion" is used to indicate the very basis of this unity.
 Popular religion may be variously characterized as a set of fundamental
 values, traditional practices, and attitudes that span all classes or regions, or
 as a distinct set of social organizations that have come to mediate elite and
 peasant worldviews. In both characterizations, however, popular religion
 functions as the medium for the diffusion of common values to a variety of
 subgroups, each of which may appropriate them in distinctive ways. Hence,
 the development of the term "popular religion" in this second-stage argument
 involves the appreciation of a dynamic role for religion as a sociocultural
 system: religion does not merely reflect and reinforce social identities and
 cleavages, but it also acts as medium for unity above and across social
 boundaries. The implications of this approach for our understanding of
 religion are still being explored.
 Although this characterization of a typical second-stage "unity" position
 links scholars who would regard each other as odd bedfellows, it does suggest
 how they as a group contrast with what is emerging as a third-stage position.
 While many studies of Chinese religion published in recent years adopt some
 form of Freedman's second-stage position, others have ventured into a posi-
 tion similar to that outlined in Davis's 1982 article. A third-stage approach to
 Chinese religion can be said to reject both a priori bifurcations as well as
 synthetic entities that mediate them (i.e., the reification of popular religion in
 a set of institutions, practices, or values). This third position wants to suggest
 that the holism of culture is not a shared level of social interaction nor a
 diffused set of normative ideas. Culture, it implies, is neither a single ideology
 or a single social group identity disseminated across the society to unite
 28 Yang, p. 81. In his article "Standardizing the Gods: The Promotion of T'ien Hou
 ('Empress of Heaven') along the South China Coast, 960-1960," James L. Watson cites
 this passage and presents an effective counterargument (in Popular Culture in Late
 Imperial China, ed. David Johnson, Andrew J. Nathan, and Evelyn S. Rawski
 [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985], p. 316).
 29 Freedman, p. 367.
 30 See Watson, "Review Article: Anthropological Analyses," pp. 356-61.
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 diverse communities. Rather, culture is presumed to involve the internal
 generation of both distinctions and unities, and its holism is described as a
 function of either underlying structures of some sort or the imposed limits of
 geography as they moderate the degrees of similarity and difference. From
 this perspective, culture comes to be described as the relationship of the parts
 to the whole, the "production" of meanings, or the "construction" of history
 and community. Unity and diversity become intrinsic to the dynamics of
 cultural holism. Third-stage approaches do not isolate religious institutions-
 or religion per se-as the data of analysis; rather, they focus on symbols and
 rituals in which they see the dynamics of culture played out. Thus, this third-
 stage approach presupposes a particular perspective for the definition and
 understanding of religious phenomena and, correspondingly, implies a dis-
 tinct theory of religion as a fully embedded cultural system.
 III
 Four of the five books to be discussed here address Taiwanese religion, and
 for very much the same reasons-as a rich and ethnographically accessible
 example of regional Chinese religion, Taiwan raises basic questions about
 unity and diversity. Hubert Seiwert's study of the Taiwanese folk tradition
 since the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911) is particularly con-
 cerned to demonstrate its autonomy-that is, as distinct from Buddhism,
 Taoism, and the official state cult, and as more than a mere syncretic soup
 made up of these three.31 To this end he describes the distinct organizations,
 specialists, ritual practices, temples, and deities, etc., of Taiwanese folk reli-
 gion. In particular, he contributes very useful descriptions of temple finances,
 lay Buddhist vegetarian sects, and both official and unofficial aspects of the
 state cult. In defining volksreligion, however, he distinguishes it vis-a-vis
 institutional religion so as to conclude that folk religion is made up of those
 practices not based on a literary tradition.32 While there have been objections
 to using the "absence of scriptures" to define the popular religious tradition,
 Seiwert's characterization is not without some validity in the Chinese case.33
 On the other hand, it echoes the distinction between higher Sanskritic Hin-
 duism and lower popular Hinduism which Tambiah, for one, faults for the
 31 Hubert Seiwert, Volksreligion und nationale Tradition in Taiwan: Studien zur
 regionalen Religionsgeschichte einer chinesischen Provinz (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner
 Verlag, 1985).
 32 Ibid., p. 17.
 33 See Julian F. Pas's review of Seiwert's Volksreligion in Journal of Chinese Reli-
 gions, no. 15 (Fall 1987), pp. 101-5. The role of texts in distinguishing traditions and
 levels of Taoist practice is explored in Kristofer Schipper, "The Written Memorial in
 Taoist Ceremonies," in Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society, ed. Arthur P. Wolf
 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 309-24, and "Vernacular and
 Classical Ritual in Taoism," Journal of Asian Studies 45, no. 1 (November 1985):
 21-51. Overmyer's work, to be discussed below, suggests a complementary view when




 same problem afflicting the distinction between great and little traditions-
 namely, there is no such actual demarcation of these levels of religion in any
 village, while there do exist many degrees of literacy and many forms of
 access to the textual teachings of the literary religious tradition.34 Although
 Seiwert argues that the Taiwanese folk religious tradition is common to all
 levels of Chinese society, even while taking quite autonomous forms in
 distinct regional institutions, in the final analysis his approach is more con-
 cerned with a first-stage issue-specifically, the autonomy of a distinct folk
 tradition-than with a second-stage concern for how common values and
 practices are disseminated across social differences.35
 David K. Jordan and Daniel L. Overmyer address Taiwanese sectarianism
 with explicit attention to both historical and ethnographical materials.36
 Their book provides an interesting contrast to Seiwert's, for despite similar
 methodological concerns to integrate the history of religions with ethno-
 graphic studies, expressed in the initial sections of both books, Jordan and
 Overmyer go on to develop a clear second-stage position. That is, they de-
 scribe a popular religious tradition (sometimes called "popular culture") with
 its own institutions and history that mediates the transmission of values bind-
 ing the larger culture together as a whole. Their specific focus is Chinese
 spirit-writing (pai-luan) sects, which they contrast with both village religion
 and the "great tradition" (elsewhere, the "central traditions of Chinese cul-
 ture"). They find that spirit-writing is "a popular cultic form with antece-
 dents, history, structure, and social embodiment, and as such it helps us
 34 Tambiah, pp. 367-73. Tambiah's book, which predates Freedman's essay on the
 sociology of Chinese religion, probably remains one of the earliest and most influential
 critiques of the limits of the first position in Asian studies, developing an argument that
 suggests a third-stage position more than a second-stage one. Another set of terms
 used to describe oral and local folk practices vis-a-vis more "universal" and elite
 textual traditions in Southeast Asian religion is "kammic" Buddhism vs. "nibbanic"
 Buddhism, variously used by Melford E. Spiro, Buddhism and Society: When a Great
 Tradition Modernizes (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Winston L. King, In the
 Hope of Nibbana: An Essay on Theravada Buddhist Ethics (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court,
 1964); and Donald K. Swearer, Buddhism and Society in Southeast Asia (Chambers-
 burg, Pa.: Anima, 1981).
 35 Taking another type of first-stage approach, Stevan Harrell's study, "The Concept
 of the Soul in Chinese Folk Religion," Journal of Asian Studies 38, no. 3 (May 1979):
 519-28, argues that "it is important to remember the basic difference between the
 religious perspectives of non-elite believers on the one hand and the assumptions of
 philosophers of religion and other specialists on the other. The perspective of the
 Confucian and Taoist traditions is analytical; reality must be explained. The perspec-
 tive of folk religion, in contrast, is fundamentally active; believers experience religious
 reality directly through purposeful behavior, especially ritual. This difference has been
 posited by Eric Wolf as basic to all peasant societies, and is confirmed by my own
 research into the religious attitudes of Chinese folk believers in Taiwan" (p. 520).
 Likewise, Lewis R. Lancaster argues that the distinction between folk and great
 traditions "remains a real one" in "Elite and Folk: Comments on the Two-Tiered
 Theory," in Religion and the Family in East Asia, ed. George A. DeVos and Takao
 Sofue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 87-95, esp. p. 88.
 36 David K. Jordan and Daniel L. Overmyer, The Flying Phoenix: Aspects of
 Chinese Sectarianism in Taiwan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986).
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 realize afresh that popular culture too is intelligible and develops over
 time."37 These groups are distinguished both by a deliberate syncretism that
 claims to transmit the distilled essence of the Chinese tradition and by the
 incorporation of aspects of the folk tradition that are independent of family,
 locality, and occupational group.38 Thus, it is by means of middle-level
 religious organizations such as these sects that individuals, rather than the kin
 groups of village religion, have the means for "self-conscious popular partici-
 pation" in activities traditionally associated with the elite levels of Chinese
 society.39
 Jordan and Overmyer appear to accept a basic divide in Chinese social
 experience even as they identify an organized means by which this divide
 between "elite" and "folk" is closed-a mediating level, represented here by
 sectarian groups, where elite values are appropriated by lower social classes
 and folk values are integrated upward into new forms of social organization.
 That is, they see popular religion as embodied in specific forms of social
 organization.40 Indeed, they suggest that there could be no larger unity of
 common values without such organizations. With a nod to Clifford Geertz,
 for example, the authors argue that the gap which arises between cultural
 values and social structure frequently means that many people have no way
 to pursue and appropriate the idealized values of the culture. Hence, the
 continued existence and dissemination of these values as common ones re-
 quire such organizations, however unorthodox, to enable other segments of
 the society to appropriate these cultural ideals.4' This is a very interesting and
 useful argument in itself.
 Although they assume a first-stage emphasis on discontinuity in Chinese
 society while formulating a second-stage position in their concern with the
 sectarian groups as the hearers of common cultural values, Jordan and
 Overmyer also anticipate some elements intrinsic to a third-stage position-
 particularly, the internal dynamics by which groups differentiate themselves
 on some levels and establish strategic identifications on others. Two examples
 representing the particular interests of each author will suffice to indicate
 these dynamics. Overmyer, for example, illustrates the important role of text
 production in differentiating the spirit-writing sect from both village religion
 and other middle-level popular religious organizations. While the activities of
 text production generate differences in those directions, they create unities in
 another by disseminating the values associated with the text-producing elite
 and symbolically analogizing sectarian activities with elite activities.42 Jordan
 37 Ibid., p. 13.
 38 Ibid., pp. 10-13.
 39 Ibid., pp. 8-10.
 40 Particularly interesting is the further evidence provided by Jordan and Overmyer
 (pp. 26-27, 100 ff.) that these religious cult organizations establish the networks used
 for political activities, a subject raised by Gary Seaman in Temple Organization in a
 Chinese Village (Taipei: Orient Cultural Service, 1978).
 41 Ibid., p. 10.
 42 Ibid., pp. 17-19, 79-81.
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 describes a different sphere of differentiation and unification when he ex-
 plores how these groups provide the opportunity for a variety of individuals
 with little in common to generate highly personalized interpretations of
 shared symbols.43
 Popular Culture in Late Imperial China is a collection of individually
 excellent papers superbly edited by David Johnson, Andrew J. Nathan, and
 Evelyn S. Rawski.44 It opens with a clear statement that the purpose of the
 volume is "to help bring the study of non-elite culture into the mainstream of
 academic discourse about China."45 For the authors, popular culture does
 not simply point to the nonelite social classes, those people "beyond the
 boundaries of the ruling class," but, rather, it designates a culture or, more
 correctly, a variety of subcultures, elements of which are "shared" by all
 social groups in China. Thus, the volume posits an underlying unity to
 Chinese culture in the mid-sixteenth to early twentieth centuries, but it
 hesitates to determine of just what this unity consisted. Indeed, that is the
 question that animates the whole work. The preface describes the dilemma
 quite neatly: In the last few centuries of imperial rule, Chinese culture was
 "both extremely diverse and highly integrated." The diversity appears rather
 easy to understand as "an obvious function of China's great size" which gave
 rise to "many varieties of popular culture," that is, nonelite subcultures with
 regional, occupational, and educational differences of all kinds. Elite culture
 also contained "significant internal variations," and popular and elite cultures
 were in turn "very different from each other." Yet at the same time "these
 diverse elements were integrated into a single complex cultural system." The
 integration of this system and the commonality of certain elements within
 "the mental worlds of all Chinese" is much harder to understand.46 To
 attempt to uncover and analyze this unity, the authors focus on the agents,
 mechanisms, and strategies involved in "the communication of values."47
 Hence, at the outset Popular Culture affirms the validity of an elite/
 nonelite distinction, while tending to see the distinction as both a social and
 cultural one. At the same time it argues for elements common to all sub-
 cultures. Unlike the second-stage positions examined above, it is not clearly
 stated that these common elements themselves constituted a "system"-either
 as values, beliefs, or institutions. Rather, much evidence is presented to
 suggest that these common elements may be the result of heightened social
 interaction across the society as a whole during this period. Indeed, it is
 suggested that the elements of this unity as such can be shown to exist
 empirically only insofar as we can map their transformations and permuta-
 tions in each social group and through each medium of communication.
 Individual papers in the volume, however, strain in various ways at this very
 43 Jordan and Overmyer, pp. 182-202, 267-76.
 44 Johnson, Nathan, and Rawski, eds. (n. 28 above).
 45 Ibid., p. ix.
 46 Ibid., pp. xi-xiii.
 47 Ibid., p. x.
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 delicate characterization of the relationship of popular culture to a funda-
 mental unity within Chinese culture.
 Two introductory articles by Evelyn Rawski and David Johnson, respec-
 tively, attempt to lay out a framework for the volume as a whole. Rawski
 addresses the social, political, and economic aspects of this period in Chinese
 history, pointing out how the "culture" of the late Ming and early Ch'ing
 differed substantially from that of earlier periods by virtue of the "frames of
 reference" that their citizens shared to an unprecedented degree.48 Hence,
 Rawski suggests that late imperial popular culture was radically shaped by
 the historical emergence of a cultural commonality made possible by new
 media of communication, the growing networks of a complex economy, and
 the social mobility of increased literacy and urbanization. Aside from the
 allusion to "shared frames of reference," however, Rawski does not specify
 exactly what comes to be held in common when the social and economic
 infrastructure of a society develops in these ways. Yet she depicts very well
 how this infrastructure makes it possible for nonelite cultures to become open
 to the influence of elite values and to the dissemination of their own.
 Johnson's article approaches the question of unity among elite and nonelite
 subcultures by asking "how the structures of communication and dominance
 affected consciousness."49 He constructs a chart of nine social groups and the
 distinctive consciousness or mentalite of each which specifies three levels of
 sociopolitical dominance (legally privileged, self-sufficient, and dependent)
 and three levels of education (classically educated, literate, and illiterate).50
 This chart does not simply fine-tune the rough polarities of elite and popular,
 or literate and nonliterate. It graphically demonstrates a gradation of social
 differentiation that makes transmission of cultural values across social groups
 not only viable but-and here Johnson anticipates a third-stage argument-
 intrinsic to the very differentiation of each group. Although Johnson prefers
 to speak of how social "structures" affected consciousness, rather than how
 socially structured mentalites reproduced social organizations, his general
 approach seems to imply that Chinese cultural unity can be seen as a
 particular relationship of parts: that is, social levels are differentiated and
 linked not by specific ideas of institutions, but through the internal dynamics
 by which each group defines itself vis-a-vis the others. Yet Johnson does not
 fully develop a third-stage position because he is not concerned to demon-
 strate how the axes of differentiation which he charts-dominance and
 education-are themselves culturally constructed. Hence, the chart acts as
 "artificial" typology which quite effectively suggests the true complexity of
 society and the importance of hitherto unrecognized groups and sensibilities.
 The articles by Rawski and Johnson can be said to define a position that
 floats between the second-stage and third-stage positions on popular religion
 48 Ibid., p. 3.
 49 Ibid., p. 35.
 50 Johnson notes that ideally the chart would include a third axis to differentiate
 urban, rural, and linguistic regions (ibid., p. 56).
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 described earlier. Both suggest that the underlying unity of Chinese culture
 must be explored in a historical framework, but they maintain that such unity
 is not a function of the emergence of a distinct ideology, social group, or set
 of institutions. Rather, cultural integration has much more to do with the
 heightened transmission of cultural ideas and the increased ability of various
 groups to appropriate them in ways that generate a complex orchestration of
 differences and commonalities. Thus, they want to avoid the second-stage
 tendency to reify cultural unity in particular ideas, groups, or institutions,
 and they thereby anticipate the types of third-stage argument suggested in
 Natalie Davis's approach to "religious cultures."
 Yet both find it easier to specify how elite values came to dominate late
 imperial popular culture rather than how elements of nonelite values came to
 penetrate elite culture. Indeed, Johnson observes that this period is marked
 by "the extraordinary degree to which values and beliefs favorable to the
 ruling class permeated popular consciousness."5"Rawski's data on the new
 means of communication and the social networks that derive from them as
 well as Johnson's data on the many degrees of literacy point to the roles new
 social organizations might play in the cultural integration of this period.
 Rawski and Johnson do not address how elite values themselves might have
 been affected by the new socioeconomic technologies and networks for their
 dissemination or by the fact that these values were shaping society as a
 variegated whole to an unprecedented degree. Hence, both writers have much
 in common with the second-stage argument that appreciates the cultural
 mediation of elite and popular groups in particular social formations.
 Despite these concerns, or perhaps because of them, Popular Culture is
 both richly provocative and scrupulously nonreductive in its concern to
 explore cultural holism as more than the diffusion of a set of particular ideas
 or institutions to act as a common denominator across the diversities of class
 and region. Rather, it is suggested that any "system of thought, or a reli-
 gious revelation, or any other creation of the human verbal imagination,
 spread[s] through Chinese society ... [coming] to exist in a number of ver-
 sions, each produced by or for an important social-cultural group." Only if
 we identify and study "all the versions of it that were produced" will we begin
 to see the significance of the commonalities that afford the opportunities for
 differentiation.52
 Religion is significant in every essay in this volume, but four essays ex-
 plicitly address popular religion as such. Judith A. Berling, for example,
 51 Ibid., p. 46.
 52 Ibid., pp. 71-72. In addition to this "third-stage" style of statement, in a final
 "postscript" concerning the ramifications of the argument advanced in the volume as a
 whole, Rawski emphasizes the importance of looking at religion, drama, and ritual in
 order to understand popular culture, a focus on symbolic activities that also charac-
 terizes third-stage approaches to religion and culture (pp. 408-12). The role of the
 media of social communication in shaping the messages transmitted through the
 culture is a recent and revolutionary insight into culture. Although Rawski and
 Johnson do not directly address it (several other articles do give it some attention),
 their analyses make clear the usefulness of pursuing this point.
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 characterizes the distinctive religiosity of seventeenth-century local elites of
 Southeast China as expressions of "middle-level popular culture"; that is,
 they incorporated values that spanned the culture as a whole and yet emerged
 with a historically and regionally distinct identity.53 Daniel L. Overmyer's
 look at the values extolled in sectarian "precious scrolls" (pao-chiian) also
 reveals how people "in the middle-level of learning and status, neither schol-
 ars on the one hand nor illiterate laborers and peasants on the other," could
 express distinctive and implicitly dissenting versions of the diffused orthodox
 value system.54 Thus, both Berling and Overmyer suggest that new socio-
 economic conditions were not just communicating traditional elite values
 more effectively, but they also facilitated the creation of new versions of these
 values that were more accessible in turn to nonelite groups.
 Susan Naquin's article raises several interesting points: first, she demon-
 strates how new sectarian religions after the sixteenth century were adapted
 to a variety of social constituencies, producing an incredible diversity of
 practice and organization as well as great continuity-all within a "hetero-
 dox" tradition.55 She considers this sectarian tradition to be a "popular
 religious institution" because it drew its membership primarily from "the
 people at large," rarely from the elite. But as heterodox institutions, they
 differed from more orthodox forms of popular religion by being less able to
 bridge "the gap between state and society."56 Ultimately Naquin suggests a
 continuum of popular religious groups mediating state and society, differen-
 tiating themselves in a variety of ways, but most choosing to remain a
 realistic social option for a wide segment of the population.57 Thus, Naquin
 identifies what we might call a sectarian "subculture," marked by both unities
 and diversities, which promoted its own distinct forms of social integration
 across the regional and class diversities of China. Naquin underscores her
 conclusion that this religious culture "was neither unchanging nor a confusing
 blend of miscellaneous practices. It was a living tradition, with systematic
 variations within it, one that responded to the times and to the changing
 nature of the communities where it found adherents."58
 James L. Watson's analysis of the many interpretations of the goddess
 T'ien Hou is one of the richest in this volume.59 Less concerned with any
 distinct middle level of culture, Watson focuses on the up and down trans-
 mission of T'ien Hou beliefs whereby elite written accounts reached down-
 ward and local oral tales penetrated upward. In doing so, he explicates a
 53 Judith A. Berling, "Religion and Popular Culture: The Management of Moral
 Capital in The Romance of the Three Teachings," in Johnson, Nathan, and Rawski,
 eds. (n. 28 above), pp. 188-218.
 54 Daniel L. Overmyer, "Values in Chinese Sectarian Literature: Ming and Ch'ing
 Pao-chuan," in Johnson, Nathan, and Rawski, eds., pp. 219-54, see esp. pp. 253-54.
 55 Susan Naquin, "The Transmission of White Lotus Sectarianism in Late Imperial
 China," in Johnson, Nathan, and Rawski, eds., pp. 255-91, esp. pp. 255-60.
 56 Ibid., p. 289.
 57 Ibid., pp. 289-90.
 58 Ibid., pp. 290-91. For a relevant definition of subculture, see Dick Hebdige, Sub-
 culture: The Meaning of Style (London: Methuen, 1979).
 59 Watson, "Standardizing the Gods" (n. 28 above), pp. 292-324.
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 major feature or vehicle of popular culture per se: the literati's "standardi-
 zation of culture" by which local cults were forced to conform to nationally
 accepted models. One of the ways that the elite class did this was through the
 proliferation of written accounts of popular deities, since a written account,
 by virtue of the medium itself, tended to minimize the discrepancies of local
 color and emphasize more universal (or national) values.60 Watson also
 describes a particular "genius" for cultural integration among Ming-Ch'ing
 policymakers whereby they never tried to legislate beliefs or the symbolic
 content of deities. Rather, by imposing a "structure" (as opposed to the
 content) of proper ritual forms, they allowed sufficient flexibility for people at
 all levels of society to appropriate a few symbols in highly meaningful ways.61
 Watson's observations on this point complement those of Jordan and Over-
 myer on the individual appropriation of symbols in Taiwanese sectarianism.
 In addition, Watson's regionally focused analysis, like that of Berling, sug-
 gests that cultural unity is not so simple as the transmission of particular
 values or practices that are appropriated by different social groups. Instead,
 Watson takes a third-stage perspective when he explores how these values
 and practices were "reproduced" in strategically changed ways, due either
 to the fundamental differences of perception and expression that accom-
 pany different regional and class interests or to various forms of political
 manipulation.62
 As the title of his book indicates, Robert P. Weller is particularly con-
 cerned with unity and diversity in Chinese religion and culture, and his first
 chapter is a careful exploration of the issues involved, only some of which are
 raised here.63 Weller begins by suggesting that Freedman's argument for the
 essential unity of Chinese culture simply dismissed diversity by reducing it to
 some underlying structural unity. He sympathetically cites opposing litera-
 ture, yet he sides with neither the "diversity" faction nor the "unity" faction.
 He sets out instead to develop a "theory of culture" able to account for both
 differentiation and integration, that is, a third-stage argument. Like Natalie
 Davis, he focuses on ritual, a single ritual, the "ghost-feeding ceremony" (or
 Universal Salvation Festival, Pho To) as performed in a small township in
 Taiwan.64
 Drawing on Edward Sapir, E. P. Thompson, Raymond Williams, and
 Antonio Gramsci, among others, Weller suggests that culture is not an entity
 60 Ibid., pp. 296-98.
 61 Ibid., p. 323.
 62 Watson's essay in Johnson, Nathan, and Rawski, eds., is an interesting develop-
 ment of his earlier critique of Freedman's notion of a unified Chinese religious system
 and his own interests in the structural aspects of cultural practices, both represented in
 the review article noted above (n. 24).
 63 Robert P. Weller, Unities and Diversities in Chinese Religion (Seattle: University
 of Washington Press, 1987).
 64 Stephen E. Teiser also focuses on this ceremony in his recent book, The Ghost
 Festival in Medieval China (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988). Teiser
 is similarly concerned to portray the rite "as it appears at all levels of Chinese society,"
 rather than consign it "to the amorphous lump of 'popular religion'" (p. 217).
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 to be identified on some level of social organization or tracked as it diffuses
 across social classes; neither is it a preset "structure" or code that inheres in
 all aspects of social life. Inseparable from the activities that produce it, he
 argues, culture is the production of meanings within the "real constraints of
 both society and class."65 He suggests two "styles" of producing meaning in
 the Chinese religious context: (a) through pragmatic, context-bound interpre-
 tations which are active and personal in nature, stressing the activities of
 gods and ghosts, and associated at one extreme with popular religion; and
 (b) through ideologized (institutional and systematic) interpretations, which
 tend to be passive and impersonal, stressing moral laws and psychological
 themes, and associated with state, monastic, or official religion at the other
 extreme.66 Weller argues that the important questions no longer center on a
 fundamental unity or diversity in Chinese religion and culture but, rather, on
 which style of interpretation is used by which group, under what circum-
 stances, and why. He explores these questions by analyzing interpretations of
 the ghost-feeding ritual from three viewpoints: the popular one, that of the
 specialist, and that of the elite. The ethnographic contribution of this parallel
 material is significant. Yet Weller's more formal conclusions tend to reiterate
 the familiar. For example, he finds (a) that the diversity and unity among
 interpretations depends upon the social relations of the groups involved,
 (b) that ideologized groups push for more impersonal and universalized inter-
 pretations, (c) that interpretation changes with changing social conditions,
 (d) that popular interpretation is not automatically opposed to elite, and
 (e) that pressures toward both unity and diversity render ideologies much
 more complex and flexible in practice than usually thought, etc. His less
 formalized results are more interesting, particularly his evidence of key ways
 in which people reproduce social distinctions and social unities by absorbing
 different understandings and producing transformed meanings. Most effective
 in this regard are his discussions of geomancy and the use of texts and oral
 tradition to control access to information.
 Weller starts out with a radically different notion of culture, but it appears
 that in practice he may have confined it simply to a level of ideology without
 using it to address social structure as well. That is, he does not follow the
 circularity of cultural production to show not only how different groups
 produce different interpretations, but how the differences among these inter-
 pretations reproduce the differences among social groups. Weller appears to
 have taken social structures as a given, assuming three social levels or types
 (the peasant, the religious specialist, and the elite). Thus, the poles of an
 "elite/folk" framework are softened only slightly by the addition of the
 popular religious specialist, while the interpretations of each type often ap-
 pear to be mere "projections" of the "realities" of social organization.67
 65 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
 66 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
 67 Although Weller's third entity, the popular religious specialist, is not presented as
 a distinct social embodiment of popular culture per se, as suggested, e.g., in the work
 of Overmyer and Naquin, this middle-level specialist does appear to mediate the other
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 The last book to be examined here, P. Steven Sangren's History and
 Magical Power in a Chinese Community, is specifically concerned with this
 circularity of cultural production and with the importance of recognizing
 religion as more than a projection of social structure.68 Sangren incorporates
 a rather different angle on culture, one promoted by G. William Skinner's
 distinctive approach to the unities and diversities of Chinese culture. Skinner
 has pioneered a type of systems-analysis method that spatially analyzes
 "regional systems" formed by nested social hierarchies and temporally ana-
 lyzes the history of "development cycles" within these regional systems.69 For
 Skinner, the holism of culture is a matter of the relationship among the parts;
 hence, culture implies the unities and diversities that identify groups and
 subgroups as parts of a whole. This is certainly the type of theory of culture
 that Johnson and Weller were also pursuing. Using it, Sangren, a former
 student of Skinner, undertakes a "revisionist reappraisal" of Chinese folk
 religion.70 He wants to go beyond the standard first-stage position in which
 an "elite/folk" distinction bifurcates Chinese culture, as well as a second-
 stage position in which Chinese cultural unity is based on watering down the
 "great tradition" until it has disseminated throughout the society. To do this,
 he presents an agenda with three basic points. First, building on Skinner's
 theory of hierarchical regional systems in which the "standard marketing
 community" is the appropriate focus of study, Sangren establishes a fuller
 model of social unity by arguing that ritual organization is a system con-
 gruent with the economic and administrative systems laid out by Skinner and
 a necessary element in any analysis of the other two. Second, Sangren also
 demonstrates a basis for cultural unity. He does not look for it in a particular
 level of social interaction or in particular institutions that spread common
 values, nor in any set of widespread collective representations that are mere
 projections of social integration. Rather, he argues that the holism of Chinese
 culture lies in "a logic of symbolic relations that underlies manifest differences
 in social institutions across class, region and time," which he variously calls
 "structures of value," a unified set of cosmological assumptions, or "cultural
 logic."71 Third and most important, Sangren wants to demonstrate the rela-
 tionship between culture and social organization (i.e., between the unities
 noted above) by showing the dynamics by which social interaction reproduces
 both cultural value structures and the social institutions legitimated by these
 values.72
 extremes and thus reinforce an "elite/folk" dichotomy. In the end, Weller's three
 "types" are comparable to the more complex model provided by David Johnson's
 chart, discussed above (n. 50).
 68 P. Steven Sangren, History and Magical Power in a Chinese Community (Stan-
 ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987).
 69 See G. William Skinner, ed., The City in Late Imperial China (Stanford, Calif.:
 Stanford University Press, 1977), and "The Structure of Chinese History," Journal of
 Asian Studies 44, no. 2 (February 1985): 271-92.
 70 Sangren, pp. 4-9, 49.
 71 Ibid., p. 1.
 72 The approach developed by Sangren echoes that of Tambiah (n. 26 above).
 Tambiah focuses on a "total field," "ritual complexes," and "traditional networks" in
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 Sangren considers the holism of Chinese culture to be a matter of those
 dynamics that reproduce values, classes, and social organizations over time.
 He attempts to portray the operation of these dynamics by breaking "the
 whole" down into two analytic aspects-the synchronic or semiotic dimen-
 sion of the symbols that embody these values (i.e., sphere of ritual) and the
 diachronic dimension of the historical processes of social interaction through
 which such cultural unities are constantly reproduced. In this way he will call
 attention to particular practices that produce both unity and diversity, such
 as the incorporation and legitimation of contradictory values. Indeed, as in
 Watson's analysis of T'ien Hou beliefs, Sangren takes practices associated
 with the Taiwanese goddess Ma-tsu to illustrate Freedman's formula that
 Chinese society allowed religious similarity to be expressed as though it were
 religious difference.73 Yet when he attempts to give substance to Freedman's
 basic description of Chinese culture-that it is both unified and hierarchically
 diverse-in terms of the interaction of symbols and social organization,
 Sangren seems to conclude that the structural unity underlying the substan-
 tive differences is simply the principle of hierarchization.74
 Sangren may be pulled in two directions by the models of culture proffered
 by second-stage and third-stage positions. Taking a second-stage position, he
 sees culture as the synchronic religious system, defined therein as distinct
 from the historical processes that shape social organization. Hence, the only
 basis for "unity" between them is an abstract "structure" of hierarchization.
 But when taking a third-stage approach, he also sees culture as the dialectical
 dynamic by which ideologies and social conditions produce each other,
 affording both differentiation and integration of various subgroups. As in
 other third-stage positions, ritual emerges as Sangren's major focus, but the
 conflict of models, evidenced in the sheer density of the discussion, also
 shapes his portrayal of ritual. On the one hand, ritual is "constitutive" of
 culture itself, the synthesis of magic and history that reproduces community,
 religious symbols, and the socialization of individuals (while suppressing
 consciousness of the arbitrariness of the order imposed); on the other hand,
 ritual is the synchronic dimension of fundamental values that is analyzed
 separately from the history of social organization.75
 Sangren's book is probably the most ambitious and difficult of all those
 under review here, and it is no easy task to analyze his argument and his use
 of data. This is due in part to the dominating role of theory-issues are
 delineated as problems in the history of scholarship on Chinese culture as
 much as they are problems directly raised by the data themselves. Yet this
 order to explore specifically the historical and sociological "continuities and trans-
 formations" that distinguish groups in time and space. He finds that religion on any
 one level, such as the Thai village, is a "synchronic, ordered scheme of collective
 representations" that includes within it a hierarchical representation of larger religious
 frameworks such as "the grand Buddhist literary and historical tradition" (p. 2).
 73 Sangren, p. 133; on Ma-tsu, pp. 86-92, 120-26, etc.; Freedman (n. 21 above),
 p. 367. Unlike Weller, who began by rechallenging Freedman's thesis of unity, Sangren
 ends by trying to substantiate it.
 74 Sangren, pp. 14-17, 133-34, 143, 159-65, 216-25.
 75 Ibid., p. 230.
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 feature of the work makes it of particular interest since History and Magical
 Power thereby recapitulates most of this tradition of scholarship and the
 issues that have defined it.
 IV
 Since Yang and Freedman, most students of Chinese religion have recognized
 that the polarization of religion into "elite" and "folk" levels replicates an
 indigenous Chinese viewpoint. "When an educated Chinese, writing about
 Chinese religion as though from the outside, says that a rational agnosticism
 characterizes the elite and an indiscriminate superstition the masses, he is in
 reality writing from the inside and expressing the elite's view of the difference
 between the two great layers of his society."76 Thus, some scholars reject
 these categories as analytical tools, suggesting that they not only fail to
 explain anything, but as indigenous attitudes such categories themselves
 require explanation in any theory of Chinese culture and society. As noted
 above, Natalie Davis took this view when exhorting scholars to examine how
 such distinctions were made and used in specific periods to create a "whole"
 that ordered experience and supported the social order. In their various ways,
 the authors of these five books do just that, exploring how basic distinctions
 created "wholes" which constructed a social order, constituted history, and
 located individual and group experiences, etc. However, they simultaneously
 question the adequacy of these distinctions within a "professional perspec-
 tive." Indeed, their self-conscious and flexible sense of the theoretical enter-
 prise is one of the ways in which these studies suggest a fresh stage in the
 study of Chinese religion.
 By calling attention to the terms "popular religion" and "popular culture,"
 this review has attempted to explore the relationship of these terms to the
 issue of Chinese unity and diversity and to our theoretical models of culture
 and society. The identification of three typical positions has been merely a
 rudimentary means to introduce some preliminary assessment of the various
 ways in which these issues are defined and approached. Certainly, these three
 positions do not exhaust the possibilities, nor do they adequately represent
 the significant insights of each author pigeonholed by them. Moreover, while
 presenting these three positions as a sequence of arguments that emerged
 historically, there is no intent to attach any teleological significance to that
 sequence. The development of positions according to these three rough cate-
 gories does suggest, however, that terminological rearrangements and argu-
 ments naturally differentiate themselves from preceding paradigms while
 retaining many basic assumptions. Certainly, the debate over culture, society,
 and history evidenced in these three positions is a longstanding one and not
 likely to be "resolved" through the hegemony of any one position or set of
 terms.77
 76 Freedman, p. 367. Freedman echoes Yang's discussion of the elite attitude that
 educated Chinese are not religious (Yang [n. 20 above], pp. 3-6).
 77 See Louis Schneider and Charles M. Bonjean, eds., The Idea of Culture in the
 Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), esp. the article by
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 Altogether these books clearly shift the landscape for studies of Chinese
 religion-not so radically as to lose sight of traditional monuments on the
 horizon, but sufficiently to call attention to new spheres and avenues of
 exploration. Most intriguing are several directions suggested by a clustering
 of attention or consensus. The first concerns culture and the identification of
 religious phenomena within it. Weller and Sangren are convincing in their
 concern for an approach to culture that goes beyond a model in which
 common values are disseminated to act as glue holding the parts together.
 Recasting their insights, an effective approach might consider culture as the
 production of parts in relation to other parts-that is, as the creation and
 recreation of distinctions and unities in social organization and religious
 ideology so as to form a variety of meaningful wholes for persons, specific
 groups, or an emerging national consciousness. This approach would appre-
 ciate the holism of culture where it actually exists, on the scale of a local
 community or a regional system or, by virtue of new networks and tech-
 nologies, as a nation. Further theoretical work is needed to address the
 complexity of the dynamics of integration and differentiation without bifur-
 cating them. For example, Freedman's perception of the "elite/folk" di-
 chotomy as an indigenous one serving the interests and identity of the elite
 suggests that such categorization was a strategic means of simultaneously
 promoting integration within that social group and its differentiation from
 other groups expediently lumped together. This approach tends to see reli-
 gious differences and similarities not as the result of social organization, but
 as a major type of social and cultural activity. Exploration of why certain
 differences or unities are produced through specifically religious activities
 promises to yield a much more dynamic understanding of the role of religion
 in Chinese culture.78
 A second direction concerns Sangren's expansion of Skinner's regional-
 systems approach so as to include ritual organization. Certainly this focus
 suggests a more effective body of empirical data than a single ritual, the
 traditional village of ethnological fieldwork, or the abstract category of
 popular religion.79 While Tambiah's work is also a model of regional analy-
 sis and useful in its appreciation of the local presence of a universalizing,
 James A. Boon, "Further Operations of Culture in Anthropology: A Synthesis of and
 for Debate," pp. 1-32. Also see Raymond Williams's history of these terms, Culture
 and Society, 1780-1950, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983; first
 published 1958). Roy Wagner develops a particularly lucid third-stage position on
 culture in The Invention of Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
 78 Watson, e.g., discusses the role of religion as a medium for the differentiation of
 group (social and regional) identities ("Review Article: Anthropological Analyses"
 [n. 24 above], pp. 359-62). Jordan and Overmyer's discussion of symbols and texts
 also hints at the significance of religion in this regard. Weller's material on the
 interpretive differences that distinguish social groups would figure prominently in such
 work, as would Sangren's analysis of how practices such as pilgrimage both differen-
 tiate and unify within a regional network. Ultimately such an approach might analyze
 the emergence and use of the "elite/folk" dichotomy itself in Chinese culture and
 Chinese studies.
 79 As David Johnson himself notes (n. 50 above), his chart could be readily
 "grounded" in a regional systems approach (p. 70). Berling develops her regional
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 literary tradition, such as Buddhism, Skinner's "nested" and "hierarchical"
 system based on the marketing community is ultimately more logical and
 encompassing.
 A third direction lies in the historical questions explicitly raised by Rawski
 and Johnson, and implicitly suggested by Seiwert, Sangren, Overmyer,
 Berling, and others. Rawski and Johnson are particularly convincing in their
 concern to work out the empirical basis-that is, the socioeconomic forces
 and real networks of social interaction-for the historical emergence of a
 more embracing system of relationships whereby even the most local com-
 munity came to experience itself as defined vis-a-vis a larger national whole.
 Their analyses suggest that a historical framework would encourage us to
 approach the characterization of "popular religion" or "popular culture"
 within particular historical limits and conditions. Two rather different studies
 are examples of this approach. For medieval Europe, Brian Stock has de-
 scribed the emergence in the eleventh and twelfth centuries of descriptive
 terms denoting a distinction between an elite and learned social stratum and
 an illiterate, oral, or "popular" social stratum.80 The emergence of this con-
 sciousness at this particular time, he suggests, was due to the ways in which
 literacy was reshaping both the structures of belief and the nature of social
 relations. Not surprisingly, the distinction between "learned" and "popular"
 was not a fixed one since it functioned polemically to differentiate the "true"
 interpretations of the "erudite" from the "untrue" interpretations espoused or
 defended by another group. Stock finds that this polemical language was not
 content merely to differentiate literate from popular, but went on to describe
 the latter as the "popularization" or debasement of literate culture on the one
 hand, or as heretical and diabolical anti-truths on the other.81 Discussing
 Chinese history, Tadao Sakai has attempted to document the emergence in
 the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of a consciousness of "popular cul-
 ture" that cut across the distinctions of class, education, and occupation.82 He
 describes the historical evolution of terms to express such a consciousness as
 well as the variety of social groups that both presumed and nurtured the
 assumptions of a popular culture. Both scholars approach "popular culture"
 as a historically defined phenomenon, as data, not as an analytical tool for
 interpreting historical materials.
 James Boon has observed that as "a community of dialogue and debate,"
 every academic discipline needs "a fruitful paradox." In the field of anthro-
 pology, this paradox is culture.83 Historians of religions certainly have their
 approach further in conjunction with Tambiah's notion of a "religious field" in "Re-
 visioning Chinese Religions: A Model of Religions in Context" (paper presented at the
 American Academy of Religion, Boston, December 7, 1987).
 80 Brian Stock, The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of
 Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
 versity Press, 1983), pp. 99-100.
 81 Ibid., p. 242.
 82 Tadao Sakai, Dokyo no sogo teki kenkyu (Tokyo: Kokusho kank6kai, 1977),
 pp. 370-93.
 83 Schneider and Bonjean, p. 1.
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 own paradox. And although it is one of the qualities of a paradox that
 everyone has a different formulation of it, ours surely concerns the relation-
 ship of religion to culture, particularly the priority of one in understanding
 the other. For this reason, historians of religions working in all cultural areas
 will find the voices raised in these books on Chinese religion to be lively,
 relevant, and challenging contributions to the familiar-and unresolvable-
 conversation that engages and defines us.
 CATHERINE BELL
 Santa Clara University
